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The Relation of the Helsinki Final Act to the 
Emigration of Soviet Jews 
II There are no intemaZ affairs Zeft on our crowded earthl 
Mankind's sole salvation lies in everyone making everything 
his business." 
- ..4 Ze:cander 80Zzh6faitl1ln 
American concern about the emigration of Soviet Jews has 
proven to be a major obstacle in the path of detente. Plans 
ranging from ballet performances to trade negotiations have 
suddenly been derailed by outbursts of public indignation in the 
United States over the plight of Soviet Jewry. One event that 
was not so obstructed was the signing of the Final Act of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CACE) 1 
Both East and West agreed that it was an event of great sig-
nificance, for it provided a distinct framework through which 
the policy of detente cOuld be implemented and evaluated.2 How-
ever, there is little agreement as to what legal impact the Act 
should have upon the emigration policies of the USSR. The 
West claims that the Helsinki accord commits the Soviet Union 
to an easing of restrictions. This contention is generally based 
1 Full text of the CSCE Final Act has been reproduced in 73 DEPT. STATE BULL. 
323 (1975). 
2 President Ford has described the goals of the Final Act as the yardstick by 
which the success of detente was to be measured. 73 DEPT. STATE BULL. 305 (1975). 
For the statements of Warsaw Pact leaders see Hearings on H. Res. 864 and H.B. 
9466 (8.8679) before the 8uboomm. on International Politioal and Military ~ffairs 
of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess., at 15 
(1975-76). 
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upon the Act's human rights and contracts sections.8 The USSR 
not only denies this interpretation, but asserts that the Act's 
non-intervention provisions 4 prohibit the West from interposing 
itself into what the Soviets claim is a purely domestic affair.5 
This "intervention" dispute runs throughout the broad spec-
trum of East-West human rights concerns.6 
Despite the wide scope of these concerns, this study shall focus 
upon the relatively narrow issue of the emigration of Soviet 
Jews. This narrow focus serves several functions. First of all, 
the ability to emigrate is often vital to the effective exercise of 
other rights.T Secondly, this issue is probably the most" solv-
able", as it does not present an inherent threat to the Soviet 
system that would permanently alter the status quo.8 Thirdly, 
the emigration provisions of the Final Act - unlike most other 
humanitarian pledges - are especially significant in that their 
8 See complete text, notes 23 & 24, infra. 
4 See complete text, note 23, ;'nfra. 
II The USSR recently went so far as to charge Belgium with a direct and un· 
equivoeal violation of the Helsinki accord by having allowed an international con· 
ference on Soviet Jewry to be held on its territory. See Ryzhov, Slander Fair; 
Zionist Confab in Bru&BeZl, Izvestia, Feb. 17, 1976, at 3; reprinted in XXVIII 
CUBUNT DIGEST 01' THE SOVIET PUSS 7, at 18. 
8Id. 
T In his elassic work on The Right of Everyone to Leave any Country, Including 
His Own, Jose Ingles asserted that in the absence of the right to emigrate, 
"it may be impossible to realize such other rights 88 the right to life, 
liberty and security of person; the right to the nationality of one's choice; 
the right to marry, to found a family; the right to freedom of expression, 
including the right to seek and transmit information and ideas regardleas 
of frontiers; the right to freedom of assembly and association; the right 
to work; the right to rest and leisure; the right to an adequate standard 
of living; or the right to education." 
Ingles, Study of Discrimination in Respeot of the Right of Everyone to Leave His 
CQ1Intry. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub a/229/Rev I (1963). 
8 It is unlikely, for example, that the Kremlin will agree to any measures which 
would undermine its monopoly of political power. While yielding to dissident de· 
mands for the alleviation of censorship would inevitably weaken central authority, 
the departure of a portion of· Soviet Jewry would not so alter the internal situation. 
For an analysis of the problems involved in the external promotion of democratic 
freedoms in authoritarian states such as the USSR, Bee Shulman, On Learning to 
Live with Authoritarian Regimes, 55 FOBEIGN AI'I'AIRS 334 (1977). Shulman eon· 
tends that the West should pragmatically set its priorities in accordance with what 
it ealculates that the USSR would accept. He advises that any threat to the state's 
monopoly of power would be doomed. 
1977] HELSINKI FINAl. ACT 113 
implementation is capable of being quantitatively measured.D 
Although other Soviet dissidents have also encountered emigra-
tion obstacles, the emigration of Soviet Jews is especially con-
ducive to this quantitative measurement. This amenability is 
due to the fact that the Jews constitute the only large, readily 
identifiable group trying to leave the country.l0 Furthermore, 
the obstruction of their emigration is more readily attributable 
to Soviet obstinacy, than it is in regards to those Gentiles who 
wish to leave. For example, Jews are guaranteed visas to Is-
rael, while Gentile dissidents are often denied entry to Western 
nations. This is due to the rigid immigration "quotas of the lat-
ter. The inhibiting effect of these Western restrictions upon 
those dissidents allowed to emigrate cannot be attributed to the 
Soviet authorities.ll 
Unlike the Gentiles however, the Jewish emigration situation 
is complicated by the added factor of anti-Semitism. Although 
this bias has often been attributed to Soviet authorities by J ew-
ish leaders,12 this study shall not deal with this rather compli-
cated issue as it does not bear directly upon the emigration prob-
lem. While equality of rights and privileges for all Soviet mi-
norities are mandated by the Constitution of the USSR, a 
greater percentage of Jews are being allowed to leave than are 
any other minority group.18 Furthermore, Jews are the best 
D Oommiaaion on Security Rnd Cooperation Europe, REPORT OJ' THE STUDY MIs-
SION To EUROPE To THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPUATION IN EUROPE 
1S8·59 (1976). 
10 It haa been estimated that as many aa two thirds of the 2.5 million Jews in 
the USSR would eventually emigrate in the absence of the current restrictions. 
More than 130,000 Jews in possession of Israeli visas have not yet had their emi-
pation applieations acted upon by Soviet authorities. Roughly one thousand families 
have already been relegated to the status of ' 'refusniks. " L. SCHROETER, THE 
LAST EXODUS 376 (1974); Hearim.g' before the 8ubcomm. Otl InteTfiatiofiaZ and 
lliUtar!l and Political Affair" 8Upra note 2, at 34, 80. 
11 For a discussion of these Western restrictions, see Browne, Many Refugee, 
Find W6Ilt', Barrier, High, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1977, at 14, col. 1. 
12 For a discussion of anti-Semitism in the USSR as it relates to the Russian 
criminal justice system and the emigration problem, see T. TAYLOR, COURTS OJ' 
TBBROB: SOVIET CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND JEWISH EMIGRATION (lst ed. 1976). 
18 Constitution of the U.S.S.R., Article 123; Constitution of the R.S.R.S.R., 
Article 127. 
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educated minority in the Soviet Union and enjoy professional 
prominence well out of proportion to their percentage of the 
total population.14 However the cost of this scholastic and pro-
fessional success is often cultural assimilation. Also, unlike 
other minorities, the Jews do not have their own homeland 
within the USSR in which to nourish their unique heritage. Emi-
gration is thus seen as the price of maintaining this cultural 
identity. 
This study will briefly trace the opposing policies of the East 
and West from the origins of the CSCE to their embodiment 
in the text of the Final Act. The legal status and effect of the 
Act under international law will then be addressed, particularly 
as it relates to previous human rights accords. The recurring 
problem of what constitutes intervention in another state's in-
ternal affairs will then be analyzed. Some possible conflicts 
between the Final Act and specific elements of Soviet law will 
then be identified. Finally, an evaluation of the efficacy of the 
Act will be given, along with suggestions for its further imple-
mentation. 
L DBVELOPJrlENT OJ!' THE ElIrIIGBATION ISSUE WITHIN THE 
CONTEXT OJ!' THE CASE 
. A. History 01 the OSOE 
The conflicting interpretations of the Final Act with respect 
to the emigration of Soviet Jews can be traced to the origins of 
the CSCE itself. The USSR first proposed a Conference on 
European Security in 1954.111 The purpose of such a conference 
was to secure Western recognition of the post-war territorial 
boundaries and Soviet spheres of influence. The Western alli-
ance rejected the proposal claiming that it had little to ,gain 
from such a conference.18 The West was also aware of the 
14 65 DEPT. STATE BULL. 662 (I971). 
111 Bussel, The HeZBin1ri DeolGratiOft: Brobdingnag or LiZliputf 70 AJIL 24:4:, 
n.12 (I976). 
18 Povolny, The Stwief Union and the European Security Conferenoe, XVIII 
OB.BIS 202 (I974). 
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propaganda pitfalls inherent in the plan.tT The Warsaw Pact 
renewed the call for a conference in its Bucharest Declaration of 
1966. This proposal expanded the proposed scope of the meeting 
to include the increase of intellectual, technical, and cultural co-
operation. While Western Europe was receptive to the ex-
panded proposals, the United States remained skeptical. IS This 
uncertainty was enhanced by the 1968 Czechoslovakian invasion. 
Nonetheless, in 1969 the Western Alliance gave its first favorable 
response to the idea of a CSCE in the Brussels Declaration.19 
The Declaration's provisions generally paralleled those of the 
Bucharest Declaration with respect to cooperation in the above 
fields. However this statement of the Western Alliance's posi-
tion went beyond the scope of the communist proposals in cer-
tain other areas. It included proposals on self-determination, 
non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states,2O and the 
freer movement of people and ideas. This was the first instance 
of such matters having been brought up within the context of a 
CSCE, thus providing a linkage between the resolution of na-
tional security matters and humanitarian issues. The Declara-
tion clearly indicated that past communist performance in these 
areas was unacceptable to the West.21 The Bruss~ls statement 
precluded any "real and lasting improvement in East-West re-
lations in the absence of a common interpretation of these prin-
ciples • • . without any conditions or reservations." 22 The So-
viets reacted indignantly to the human rights proposal, castigat-
ing it as "an attempt at intervention in the domestic affairs of 
the socialist countries, to confront them with such terms for the 
1714. 
18 RU88el, ",,,-a note 15, at 244. 
19Id. 
20 The non·intervention and Belf·determination proposals of the West were mainly 
directed at Soviet interventionism in Eastern Europe, Buch as the Czeehoalovakian 
invasion of 1968. For a discuasion of the con1l.icting interpretationB of the non· 
intervention and Belf·determination provisionB of the Final Act, Bee Section m 
of this article, ""Ira. 
21 North Atlantic Council: Future Development of EaBt·WeBt RelationB, DEOLAB.A· 
'l'ION O. To NOBTll ATLAN'l'IO COUNCIL (Dec., 1969). 
221iJ. 
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talks which rather resemble their direct wrecking." 28 Despite 
the hostile communist reception of the Brussels Declaration, the 
Warsaw Pact reaffirmed the Bucharest Declaration with the 
Budapest Memorandum of 1970, and further proposed that the 
OSOE be succeeded by some kind of permanent implementation 
machinery.2' 
As a result of the Nixon-Breshnev summit of 1972, the initia-
tion of a OSOE was linked to the establishment of Mutual and 
Balanced Force Reduction negotiations. By this time, the most 
serious European security problems had already been settled by 
treaties relating to Berlin and the German-Polish border.21i 
Despite continued Western insistence upon the inclusion of hu-
manitarian issues, preliminary OSOE talks commenced in Sep-
tember, 1972. During these negotiations there was a major con-
flict between the promotion of human rights by the West and the 
preservation of sovereign rights and prerogatives by the So-
viets.28 As a result of textual compromises which shall be subse-
quently indicated, the Final Act was signed by the leaders of 
thirty-five nations during ceremonies in Helsinki on August 1, 
1975.27 , 
B. Structure of the Final Act 
The conflicting positions and priorities that were evident in 
the origins and exhausting negotiations of the OSOE are also 
reflected in the Final Act. It contains language which can be 
used to justify the positions taken by either the Soviet author-
ities or those supporting the unobstructed emigration of Soviet 
Jews. 
23 Yermakov, N .t1TO Designs, Pravda, Oct. 10, 1972; see Povolny, The BONt 
Uftwn and the European 8eeuritg Confereno,e, XVIII ORBIS 223 (1974). 
24 Russel, supra note 15. 
211 Federal Republic of Germany-USSR Non-Aggression Treaty, 9 ILM 1026 
(1970); Federal Republic of Germany-Poland: Treaty Concerning Basis for 
Normalizing Relations, 10 ILM 127 (1971); Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, 
10 ILM 895 (1971). 
28 REPORT OJ' THE STUDY MISSION, supra note 9, at 29, 33. 
27 Russel, supra note 15, at 244-47 
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1. Format 
The Act is basically divided up into three sections termed 
"Baskets". Basket I deals primarily with questions relating to 
security in Europe. It is framed by a "Declaration on Prin-
ciples Guiding Relations between Participating States" (Guid-
ing Principles) which sets forth the basic norms which are to 
sovereign the implementation of the remainder of the Act. Of 
special relevance to the emigration issue are Principle VI con-
cerning non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states 
and Principle VII which calls for the promotion of and respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms.28 The remainder 
lI8 VI. Non-intervention in interfiaZ affair8 
The participating 8tates will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, 
individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic 
jurisdiction of another participating State, regardless of their mutual relations •. 
They will aecordinglyrefrain from any form of armed intervention or threat of 
such intervention against another participating State. 
They will likewise in all circumstances refrain from any other act of military or 
of political economic or other coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest 
the exercise by another participating State of the rights inherent in its sovereignty 
and thus to secure advantages of any kind. 
Accordingly, they will, inter alia, refrain from direct or indirect assistance to 
terrorist activities, or to subversive or other activities directed towards the violent 
overthrow of the regime of another participating State. 
VII. Re8pect for human rights and fundamental freedom8, 
including the freedom of thought, con8cience, religion or belief 
The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion_ 
They will promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil political, eco-
nomic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the 
inherent dignity of the human person and are esaential for his free and full develop-
ment. 
Within this framework the participating States will recognize and respect the 
freedom of the individual to profess and practice, alone or in community with others, 
religion or belief acting in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience. 
The participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect 
the right of persona belonging to such minorities to equality before the law will 
afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests 
in this sphere. 
The participating States recognize the universal significance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for which is an essential factor for the peace, justice 
and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-
operation among themselves as among all States. 
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of Basket I deals with military matters. Basket II covers co-
operation in the fields of economics, science, technology, and 
the environment. Basket III is divided into four sections which 
deal with human, informational, cultural, and educational con-
tacts. Basket Ill's provisions for cooperation in humanitarian 
and other fields have proven to be the most controversial of the 
Act.29 
They will constantly respect these rights and freedoms in their mutual relations 
and will endeavour jointly and separately, including in co-operation with the United 
Nations to promote universal and effective respect for them. 
They confirm the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and 
duties in this field. 
In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the participating States 
will act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They will also ful1il1 
their obligations as set forth in the international declarations and agreements in 
this field, including inter alia the International Covenants on Human Rights by 
which they may be bound. 
29 1. Human Contacts 
The participating States, 
Co'll8idering the development of contacts to be an important element in the 
strengthening of friendly relations and trust among peoples. 
Affirming in relation to their present effort to improve conditions in this area, 
the importance they attach to humanitarian considerations. 
Desiring in this spirit to develop, with the continuance of detente, further efforts 
to achieve continuing progress in this field. 
And c01l8cious that the questions relevant hereto must be settled by the States 
concerned under mutually acceptable conditions. 
Make it their aim to facilitate freer movement and contacts, individually and col-
lectively, whether privately or officially, among persons, institutions and organiza-
tions of the participating States, and to contribute to the solution of the humani-
tarians problems that arise in that connexion. 
Declare their readiness to these ends to take measures which they consider ap-
propriate and to conclude agreements or arrangements among themselves, as may 
be needed, and 
EZpt"68S fheir intenfioft now to proceed to the implementation of the following: 
(a) COfttGcfs atad Begular Meetings ()ft fhe BMW 
01 Family Tiel 
In order to promote further development of contacts on the basis of family ties 
the participating States will favourably consider applications for travel with the 
purpose of allowing persons to enter or leave their territory temporarily, and on a 
regular basis if desired, in order to visit members of their families. 
Applications for temporary visits to meet members of their families will be dealt 
with without distinction as to the country of origin or destination, emtin&' re-
quirements for travel documents and visas will be applied in this spirit. The 
preparation and issue of such documents and visas will be effected within reasonable 
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The section of the Final Act which deals with human contacts 
bears most directly upon the Jewish emigration problem. As a 
signatory to the Act, the USSR pledges in this section to facili-
tate" freer movements and contacts, individually and collective-
ly, whether private or officially, among persons, institutions, and 
organizations," as well as to seek the solution of related humani-
tarian problems. Basket III goes on to indicate specific areas 
in which the signatories are expected to cooperate. These areas 
include the acceleration of the processing of emigration appli-
cations,80 the lowering of related fees, 81 the prompt reconsidera-
tion of renewed applications,82 and the preservation of the rights 
time limits, cases of urgent necessity such as serious illness or death will be given 
priority treatment. They will take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that 
the fees for official travel documents and visas are acceptable. 
They confirm that the presentation of an application concerning contacts on the 
basis of family ties will not modify the rights and obligations of the applicant or 
of members of his family. 
(b) Beunijication of Familiu 
The participating States will deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with the 
applications of persons who wish to be reunited with members of their family, with 
special attention being given to requests of an urgent character - such as requests 
submitted by persons who are ill or old. 
They will deal with applications in this field as expeditiously as possible. 
They will lower where necessary the fees charged in connexion with these appli· 
cations to ensure that they are at a moderate level. 
Applications for the purpose of family reunification which are not granted may 
be renewed at the appropriate level and will be reconsidered at reasonably short 
intervals by the authorities of the country of residence or destination, whichever is 
concerned under such circumstances fees will be charged only when applications are 
granted. 
Persons whose applications for family reunification are granted may bring with 
them or ship their household and personal effects, to this end the participating 
States will use all possibilities provided by visiting regulations. 
Until members of the same family are reunited meetings and contacts between 
them may take place in accordance with modalities for contracts on the basis of 
family ties. 
The participating States will support the efforts of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies concerned with the problems of family reunification. 
They confirm that the presentation of an application concerning family reunifi· 
cation will not modify the rights and obligations of the applicant or of members 
of his family. 
so 73 DEPT. STATE BULL. 340 (1975). 
SlId. 
82Id. 
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of the applicant." A special priority is given to the reunification 
of families through emigration.34 
2. Comparative Importance of the Act's Sections 
International law does, of course, recognize a distinction be-
tween the recognition to be given to those terms which are re-
lated to the main object of an agreement and those which are 
not.311 If a term is not related to the main object, a breach of 
this minor provision need not be considered a serious violation 
of the agreement.S8 The Soviet Union has consistently stressed 
Basket 1's provisions for the inviolability of frontiers and non-
intervention in the internal affairs of other states over the hu-
man rights provisions. The Soviets view the human rights 
provisions as being quite secondary to what they consider to be 
the main object of the OSOE, which was that it provide a sur-
rogate peace treaty for World War II. This was to preserve the 
political status quo in Eastern Europe, while Moscow simul-
taneously expanded its contacts with the West. In the Russian 
view, the Western emphasis upon Basket III threatens to alter 
this status quo by using the OSOE to place humanitarian issues 
firmly upon the agenda of detente. 
The West has stressed the humanitarian provisions over the 
,others. While it does not question the importance of Basket I 
and II, it considers them to be either self executing or at least 
non-controversial. In contrast, the West views the Basket III 
provisions as being consistently violated by the Eastern bloc. 
Therefore, it feels that these abused humanitarian principles are 
in need of special protection.37 
It is submitted that while Basket I may be more compatible 
with Moscow's interests, the Soviet government cannot write off 
Basket III as mere surplusage. The terms of the Act firmly ne-
33Id. 
14 Id. 
U J.L. BBlERLY, THE LAw 01' NATIONS 328 (6th ed. 1963). 
38Id. 
3T Russel, 81IprtJ note 15; at 243-44, REPORT 01' THE STUDY MISSION, 81Ipra note 9, 
at 5-9. 
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gate any attempt to selectively implement its provisions. The 
preamble to the Final Act specifically recognizes the importance 
of the "promotion of fundamental rights" and "well being for 
all peoples." Any attempt to subordinate these provisions to 
the elevation of Basket I directly contradicts Principle X of the 
Guiding Principles which asserts that: 
All the principles set forth above are of primary signifi-
cance and accordingly, they will be equally and unre-
servedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into 
account the others. 
While the CSCE may have been initially proposed to deal 
with those issues embodied in Basket I, subsequent events ex-
panded its focus.s8 Western insistence upon the inclusion of 
humanitarian issues and the length of the subsequent negotia-
tions on them certainly indicate at least the tacit acceptance of 
the Eastern bloc to their inclusion as an important part of the 
agreement.89 Their relative significance is enhanced by the fact 
that most of Moscow's immediate Basket I goals had already 
been effectively achieved well before the CSCE through the 
signing of agreements relating to Germany!O Therefore, since 
Basket III is a material part of the Helsinki accord, the USSR 
cannot selectively exclude its provisions from implementation. 
To completely disregard Basket III the Soviet Union would 
have to question the legal efficacy of the entire Final Act. 
II. LEGAL NATURE OF THE FINAL ACT. 
A. Status Under International Law 
The Final Act fundamentally embodies political and moral 
commitments, rather than legal ones!1 Accordingly, the Soviet 
Union can rightfully claim that the Basket III provisions are 
not binding upon them. While it is not impossible for a "Final 
88 Bee discussion in section I of text, 8upra. 
89 Bee REPORT OF THE STUDY MISSION, supra note 9, at 32. 
40 Russel, supra note 15, at 245-46. 
41 REPORT OF THE STUDY MISSION, supra note 9, at 30. 
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Act" to be legally binding,42 the wording of the document and 
the general intention of the Conference delegates strongly miti-
gate against such an interpretation. The participants made 
relatively vague commitments by declaring their "resolve" and 
"intentions" to "pay due regard to and implement the Final 
Act. " To underscore their intention that the Act not be legally 
binding, the closing paragraphs state that "it is not eligible for 
registration under Article 102 of the United Nations Charter." 
This ineligibility thus prevents any signatory from invoking 
the agreement "before any organ of the United Nations," such 
as the International Court of Justice or the United Nations Hu-
man Rights Commission.48 Furthermore, the Act is not subject 
to ratification by national legislatures, which prevents the at-
tainment of legally binding force in many nations." 
Still these dilutions of the legal power of the Act were not 
inserted as a Soviet attempt to undercut its humanitarian 
pledges. Despite Basket ill's politically embarrassing provi-
sions, the Soviet delegation consistently opposed the insertion 
of terms which tended to dilute the legal force of the Act." 
They were understandably reluctant to undermine the status of 
a document representing the fruition of more than twenty years 
of their diplomatic efforts. In contrast, the Nixon and Ford 
. administrations favored the inclusion of such terms, due to Con-
gressional pressure over its tendency to conclude important in-
ternational agreements without Congressional approval.411 
On the more positive side in terms of legal efficacy, the sig-
natories did recognize the Act's high political significance, stat-
ing that: 
in exercising their BOvereign rights, including their laws 
and regulations, they will conform. with their legal obliga-
42 (Example of a binding Final Act) Final Act of the Extraordinary Administra-
tive Radio Conference to Allocate Frequency Bands for Space Radio Communication 
PurpoBeS, Nov. 8, 1963, 15 UST 887, TIAS No. 5603. 
43 BRIEBLY, aufWII note 35, at 324-25_ 
44 Mojsov, Europe IItId the World After HeZrin7ci, XXVII REvIEW O. INTDNA-
TIONAL AITAIBS 621 (Feb. 20, 1976) at 6. 
411 RuSSEL, B'l/,prll note 15, at 246-47. 
46 REPORT OF THE STUDY MISSION, auprll note 9, at 20. 
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tions under international law; they will furthermore pay 
due regard to and implement the provisions in the Final 
Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe.'7 
123 
The parties to the Act also committed themselves to make fur-
ther unilateral and bilateral efforts to achieve the aims of the 
CSCE, and to utilize the appropriate forms set forth in the 
Act.'B While these political pledges are not legally binding, 
they are still important. In view of the number. of nations and 
leaders involved, many Eastern jurists have even claimed that 
the Final Act constitutes a special kind of collection of sui 
generis legal norms.'- It is anticipated that these norms are 
likely to become an important source of customary international 
laW.1IO Therefore, it is unlikely that the Soviets will generally 
denigrate the legal status of the document to justify their eva-
sion of Basket ITI obligations.lSl 
B. Relation to Previous H timan Rights Accords 
The Act is in accordance with international law and reaffirms 
the commitment of the signatories to a number of widely recog-
nized international accords. Principle vn of the Guiding Prin-
ciples specifically commits the states to "act in conformity with 
the purposes and principles" of the United Nations Charter, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,1S2 and the Interna-
tional Covenants on Human Rights.ISB They are also to fulfill 
their obligations as stated in other "international declarations 
n 73 DEPT. STATE BULL. 326 (1975). 
'B Id. at 348. 
,. Vukadinovie, Europe Between Helsinki and Belgrade, XXVII REVIEW 01' IN-
TERNATIONAL Al'l'AmS 635 (Sept. 20, 1976), at 9. 
110 Erickson, Soviet View of the Legal Nature of C'U8tomary International Law, 
7 CASE W. RES.!. L. REV. 164 (1975). 
ISl8ee Breshnev, One Year After Helsinki, XXVIII THE CUJlII.ENT DIGEST 01' 
THE SOVIET PUSS 30, Aug. 25, 1976, at 10. 
112Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doe. A/810, at 
71-7 (1948). 
118 International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp.16, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966). 
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and agreements by which they may be bound" in the field of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. 54 
An analysis of these reaffirmed accords serves three primary 
functions. First of all, the terms of these international agree-
ments are recognized as valid municipal law in the USSR. 
Since there are no conflicting domestic laws directly relating 
to the right to emigrate, these international accords are es-
pecially relevant. Soviet law further asserts that even if there 
is conflicting domestic law, the international accords shall pre-
vail.'ill Secondly, these agreements may indicate what affect 
Basket III will ultimately have upon the Kremlin. Since So-
viet authorities claim that their citizens already enjoy rights 
at least as great as those afforded under the international pacts, 
they have claimed that they are not obligated to alter their 
practices to meet these international standards.1I8 Therefore, 
unless the Helsinki accord represents a unique step beyond its 
predecessors, there is little reason to expect the USSR to alter 
its practices to meet the Act's requirements. Finally, these 
agreements may provide additional vehicles for those using the 
Final .A,.ct as a means of pressuring Moscow on the emigration 
issue. 
1. The United Nations Charter 
The Charter of the United Nations is the most frequently 
cited accord in the Final Act. The Act affirms the supremacy 
of the U.N. Charter over all other treaties or agreements.'1T 
This is consistent with the high regard shown to the Charter 
by the USSR and in the field of international law generally. III 
II' 73 DEPT. STATE BULL. 325 (1975). 
1111 Art. 129 of the Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation for the U.S.S.R. 
and the Union Republics; Art. 64 of the Principles of Civil Legal Procedure. Yet 
this factor is tempered by the Civil Code which withdraws its protection from those 
rights whose ' 'enjoyment contradicts the purpose of these rights in a socialist 
society building communism." See B. RAMUNDO, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE: INTERNA· 
TlONAL LAW IN THE BUILDING OF COMMUNISM 40-1 (1967). 
56 Kudryavtsev, The Truth About Human Bights, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 197 (1976). 
117 73 DEPT. STATE BULL. 326 (1975). 
58G.I. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 80-1 (1974). 
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Soviet jurists credit it with the introduction of the principle of 
respect for basic human rights into international law, along 
with the imposition of corresponding duties on states.IIB They 
maintain that it is more than a treaty, for it is an important 
source of customary law due to the character of the Charter 
and its crucial role in inter-state relations.80 
The preamble of the Charter affirms "faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of human person." 
Article 1(3) goes on to stress the importance of "promoting 
and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental free-
doms for all." Articles 55 and 56 obligate individual members 
to take joint and separate action to further these ends. How-
ever, the Charter offers only limited protection to these rights 
and freedoms, as it does not specify what they are. Further-
more, Article 2(7) provides an escape clause in that it forbids 
U.N. intervention in "matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of the State." 81 Since the USSR main-
tains as a general rule that only states, and not individuals, can 
be subjects of international law, this clause frequently is in-
voked to obstruct any foreign expressions of concern over So-
viet human rights policies.a 
2. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights sought to clarify 
just what the protected human rights and fundamental free-
IIBld. 
80 This importance ill attributable to the Charter: (1) providing the legal basill 
for a global organization for peace and lIecurity (2) being given pre·eminence over 
all other treaties by.U.N. members (3) binding non·members to its principles as 
expressions of customary law. See Erickson, supra note 50, at 164-66. 
SI For a discussion of the interpretation and application of Article 2(7) in the 
human rights area, see SOBN & BURGENTBAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OJ' Hu· 
HAN RIGHTS 642-55 (1973). 
82 The USSR has criticized the airing of Soviet emigration cases in the General 
Assembly in accordance with the provisions of Article 10. Even the distribution of 
documents critical of Moscow's policies is attacked as a violation of the Charter. 
Bee id., at 839. However the Soviet Union has not hesitated to use this forum 
to attack the human rights policies of other members, such as South Africa. See 
The Case of RU88ian Wives, 3 (pt. 1) GAOR, C. 6 at 718-81. 
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doms were.63 It unequivocably stated in Article 13(2) that, 
"everyone has the right to leave any country, including his 
own, " and further asserts in Article 15 the right of everyone 
to maintain or change his nationality if he so desires." The 
USSR objected to these articles from the moment they were 
first proposed on grounds that they might enconrage emigra-
tion.6Ii It proposed an amendment to the articles which would 
protect the rights only if they were exercised "in accordance 
with the procedures laid down in the laws of that country." 
The amendment was rejected, however, as were several others 
proposed by the Soviets.8tI Although these attempts proved un-
successful, the Soviet Union has been able to invoke Article 
29(2) to justify its narrow interpretation of the emigration 
rights as it exempts those which are "determined by law solely 
for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the 
rights and freedoms of others and meeting the just require-
ments of morality, public order, and the general welfare in a 
democratic society." 87 As will be subsequently developed, these 
exemptions can be easily exploited.63 
The Soviet Union abstained when the Declaration was passed 
by the General Assembly. Its primary objection was that the 
"purely theoretical character" of the Declaration did not suffi-
ciently delineate the means for the observation of these rights.-
Despite its abstention, the Soviets have consistently proclaimed 
their support of the Declaration.7o Althongh it was originally 
non-binding, the Declaration has acquired increased interna-
63 See SOHN & BURGENTHAL, 8upra note 61, at 514-16_ 
84 Full text re,printed in 43 AJIL Supp_ 127 (1949)_ 
8113 U_N. GAOR, Pt. 1/3rd Comm_ 358 (1948). 
68 Pettiti, The Bight to Leave and to Beturn in the U.S.S.B., 5 ISRAEL Y.B. 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 274 (1975). 
87 Article 29(2) also prohibits any actions which may be used to inhibit the exer-
cise of these rights. Also see Artie.les 10, 29, and 30 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 
88 See section IV-C of text, infra. 
89 U_N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.49, at 6-12 (1948); 3 U.N. GAOR 925 (1948). 
70 Knissbaeher, AZiyah 'of Soviet J eW8: Proteotion of the Bight of Emigration 
Under InternationaZ Law, 14 HARV. J. INT'L I,. 102 (1974). 
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tiona! stature. Two resolutions, both supported by the USSR, 
have been unanimously passed by the General Assembly which 
have declared it to be binding.71 
3. The International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights 
The right to freedom of movement was reaffirmed in the In-
ternational Convenant on Civil and Political Rights. Having 
been ratified by a sufficient number of states, including the So-
viet Union, it recently became binding upon its signatories.7l1 
Article 12 provides that everyone is free to leave his own coun-
try, subject only to considerations of national security and those 
factors in Article 29(2) of the Universal Declaration.7s As pre-
viously indicated, these restrictive considerations can easily be 
manipulated to justify almost any limitations.7' 
The Soviets unsuccessfully tried to incorporate these same 
escape clauses directly into Principle VII of the Final Act.TII 
Nevertheless, it is arguable that these clauses are indirectly 
inserted into the .Act, as the Helsinki accord does make a vague 
pledge that the CSCE participants will "fulfill their obliga-
tions" consistent with the Convenant's mandate. While the 
Covenant's permissible restrictions may not constitute "obli-
71 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 
G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/L/. 323 and Add. 
1·6 (1960); Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
G.A. Res. 1904, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 35, U.N. Doc. A/5603,A/L. 435 (1963). 
For a discussion of the legal efl'ect of the Universal Declaration, see SOHN & BURGEN· 
THAL, 8'Upra note 61, at 518-22. 
72 See Knissbacher, 8'Upra note 70, at 97-9. 
7S Article 12. 1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within 
that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his 
residence. 2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own. 3. The 
above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which 
are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre 
public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are con-
sistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant. 4. No one shall 
be arbitrarily deprived OIl the right to enter his own country. International Cove-
nants on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. 16, at 49, 
U.N. Doc. A/6S16 (1966). 
74 Bee section IV-C of text, infra. 
711 Russel, 8'Upra note 15, at 268. 
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gations," the Soviets will most likely choose to regard them as 
a qualification of the Final Act. Thus the Act's reference to the 
Covenant's endorsement to free movement could be effectively 
negated.76 
4. The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
Although it is not specifically mentioned in the Final Act, 
the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination should certainly qualify for inclusion in Principle 
VII's reaffirmation of international humanitarian accords.77 Un-
like the Universal Declaration, the International Covenant, and 
the Helsinki Final Act, the Convention was originally conceived 
as a fully binding treaty. Article 5 provides guarantees of the 
right to emigrate paralleling those of the previous accords.78 
However, under the Convention, the right to emigrate is a civil 
right granted to individuals.70 Yet the creation of such a right 
was not the motivating force behind Soviet ratification of the 
Convention; rather they based their acceptance upon the com-
pelling need to combat discrimination. so The USSR has grudg-
ingly acknowledged for the first time that the rights of individ-
uals were thus protected under international law.81 Efforts to 
enforce this civil right in the Soviet courts have been largely 
unsuccessful in regards to emigration, as the courts have SIm-
ply refused to hear the cases.82 
76Id. 
77 International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimina· 
tion, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 47·51, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965). 
781d., Article 5(d): 
(d) other civil rights, in particular - (i) The right to freedom of movement 
and residence within the border of the State; (ii) The right to leave any 
country, including one's own, and to return to one's country; (iii) The 
right to nationality. 
79 V. CHALIDZE, To DEFEND THESE RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOVIET 
UNION 46·47 (1974). 
80 See U.N. GAOR 121 (1966). 
SlId. 
82 CHALIDZE, supra note 79, at 47. 
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5. Uniqueness of the Final Act 
G.!. Tunkin, a leading Soviet jurist, has summarized the es-
sential thrust of these multinational agreements as establishing 
that all states have a duty to: 
(a) respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of all 
persons within their territories. 
(b) not allow discrimination by reason of sex, race, or reli-
gion. 
(c) promote universal respect for human rights and funda-
mental freedoms and to cooperate with one another in achiev-
ing this objective.88 
Long before the OSOE, these accords firmly established emi-
gration as one of these human rights and fundamental free-
doms. However, despite Soviet recognition of the validity of 
these agreements, the non-binding Helsinki Final Act has be-
come the basis of the current offensive against the emigration 
restrictions of the USSR.84 Its utilization by critics in both the 
East and the West is attributable to the fact that it represents 
a definitive step beyond its predecessors. 
While justifying American participation in the OSOE, Presi-
dent Ford claimed that at Helsinki the communist nations were 
making a public commitment "to a greater measure of freedom 
and movement for individuals, information, and ideas than has 
existed in the past. " .~ However the measure of the right to free-
dom of movement was certainly as wide under the previous, 
rather open-ended agreements. The unique value of the Final 
Act is that it fills in this breadth with more specific details 
regarding the implementation of this right.86 The broad pro-
visions of Principle VII are clarified in Basket III, which pro-
88 TUNKIN, supra note 58, at 81. 
84 Lewis, Hunger for Bights in 80viet Bloc 8purs OPefI Protest and Criticism, 
N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1977, at 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1977, at 13, col. 6; 
N.Y. Times, May 2, 1977 at 61, col.!. 
85 Ford, Ford Defeflds HiB Helsinki Mission: Ezcerpt From 8tatemeflt, 79 U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REPORT 18 (Aug. 4, 1975). 
88 For instance, in addition to reaffirming the right to emigrate, the Final Act, 
specifically mentions the shipping of the personal goods of the emigrants. 8e,e e.g. 
73 DEPT. STAT!: BULL. 340 (1975). 
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vides recommendations regarding government attitudes, proce-
dures, and conditions. 
The reaffirmation of the right to leave one's country was also 
given a unique role at Helsinki. Human rights were given the 
same prominence in East-West relations as the peaceful set-
tlement of disputes and respect for territorial boundaries. The 
Soviets may prove more sensitive to the emigration issue now 
that its humanitarian pledges have been firmly placed into the 
more pragmatic context of detente.81 
TIl. E~IIGRATION As AN "INTERNAL AFFAIR" 
The Helsinki agreement's endorsement of freer movement 
has thus far been of little direct benefit to Soviet Jews, as the 
same interpretive conflict afflicts the Final Act as plagued the 
other international humanitarian accords.88 This disagreement 
once again focuses upon what constitutes interference in the 
domestic affairs of another country. 
The Soviets generally choose to use the internal·affairs argu-
ment as a blanket defense to any foreign criticism of its policies 
and actions.8D The general rule that a state's emigration poli-
cies and regulations are primarily a domestic matter is not ques-
tioned. However, the West maintains that by linking questions 
of human rights to those of national sovereignty through an 
international agreement, the protection of these humanitarian 
rights becomes an international concern. As such, the fate of 
these rights within the USSR cannot be insulated from foreign 
exposure by categorizing them as internal affairs. Humanitar-
ian issues are thus considered to be as appropriate a concept in 
international relations as are military and territorial matters. 
The USSR recognizes th~ existence of a close link between a 
state's guarantee of "basic rights and freedoms and the main-
87 REPORT OF THE STUDY MISSION, 8'Upra note 9, at 32. 
88 Compare an example of Soviet interpretation of U.N. Charter '86 SORN " 
BUBGENTHAL, 8'Upra note 61, at 844. 
89 See e.g. Ryzhov, 8'Upra note 5; REPORT OF THE STUDY MISSION, IUpra note 9, 
at 6, Zhukov, SeZ/-Appointed I'II.8pector., XXVIII CURRENT DIGEST 01' THE SoVIBT 
PRESS 43, Oct. 28, 1976, at 30. 
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tenance of international peace and security." 80 The Soviet 
Union also acknowledges that the regulation of human rights 
is now an acceptable intrusion by international law into what 
was once a totally domestic sphere.81 Yet, it still contends that 
human rights remain domestic affairs which are incapable of 
direct international regulation ;82 International law is seen as 
an auxiliary means of protection.83 
Neither the Western and Eastern perspectives on the role of 
human rights in international law is determinative of the inter-
nal affairs issue. The conflicting interpretations of the Act by 
the East and West reflect their general policy interests, as well 
as their ideologized positions. During the final ceremonies of 
the CSCE, Breshnev stated that the basic point of the Final Act 
was that no state should interfere with the workings of the in-
ternallaws and policies of another state.84 He later went on to 
make a sharp distinction between the implementation of imme-
diately binding principles such as the inviolability of frontiers 
and non-intervention in internal affairs, and the human rights 
provisions whose implementation is contingent upon further 
consultations with individual countries.811 The priority he ac-
corded to the non-intervention principle reflects Soviet fears 
that the Final Act could be utilized as an interventionist wedge 
into its human rights affairs. This non-intervention stance is 
primarily based upon Guiding Principles I and VI. The Sov-
ereign Equality Principle (I) requires that the signatories re-
spect"each other;s'-'rights to determine its own laws and regu-
lations." lie Principle VI prohibits any direct or indirect inter-
\10 TtJNKIN, BUprtJ note 58, at 81. 
8IId., at 82. 
82 For a more detailed discussion of the role of human rights in communist in· 
ternationallegal theory, see section IV·C of text. 
83 TuN'KIN, BUprtJ note 58, at 82·3. 
84 Russel, BUprtJ note 15, at 256 & n. 39. 
85 HetJring8 on H. Be8. 864, BUprtJ note 2, at 37. 
98 I. SO'IJereign eq'lJ4lity, re8pect for the right8 
inherent in 8o'IJereignty 
The participating States will respect each other's sovereign equality and indio 
viduality as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, 
including in particular the right of every State to judicial equality, to territorial 
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vention in the domestic affairs of another state through an 
attempt to subordinate the other's sovereign rights to one's 
own advantage.D7 
The West has chosen to interpret these provisions in a man-
ner that repudiates the "Breshnev Doctrine" which seeks to jus-
tify forceful Soviet intervention into the affairs of Eastern Eu-
rope. This doctrine asserts a distinction between the interstate 
relations of the communist and non-communist nations under in-
ternationallaw. It claims that the common interests and aspira-
tions of the socialist working peoples transcend borders and are 
indivisible. While a communist country is free to promote so-
cialism in its own manner, any threat to socialism itself requires 
that all true socialists take action to insure that the "legitimate" 
national interests are protected.D8 As events in Poland, Hun-
gary, and Czechoslovakia have indicated, these "legitimate" 
interests generally coincide with those of the USSR. 
Under the terms of the Final Act, the Breshnev doctrine 
would not be an acceptable form of intervention. Principle VI 
clearly forbids intervention "in all circumstances ... regard-
less of their mutual relations." However the doctrine is cir-
cuitously reprieved by Guiding Principle X. This section re-
. quires that the participants must also honor their obligations 
arising from other international treaties and agreements. The 
Soviet Union has already embodied the doctrine in "mutual 
integrity and to freedom and political independence. They will also respect each 
other's right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cnltural 
systems as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations. 
Within the framework of international law, all the participating States have 
equal rights and duties. They will respect each other's right to define and conduct 
as it wishes its relations with other States in accordance with international law and 
in the spirit of the present Declaration. They consider that their frontiers can 
be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agree-
ment. They also have the right to belong or not to belong to international organiza-
tions, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the 
right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance j they also have the right to 
neutrality. 
07 See ,",pra, note 28. 
08 Bee B. RAKUNDO, ,",pra note 55, at 33-36, 103-107; Russel, ,",PTO note 15, at 
258-57. 
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assistance" treaties with Warsaw Pact nations." These agree-
ments are irreconcilable with the Final Act. Nonetheless, trea-
ties have a higher status under international law than would the 
Helsinki agreement. This legal supremacy can thus be utiJized 
to insulate the Breshnev Doctrine from critics citing the Final 
Act. 
The selective assertion that the non-intervention principle is 
applicable to Western concern over the Jewish emigration issue, 
but not to Moscow's efforts to help keep Eastern Europe in line 
still poses a serious interpretive dilemma for the Kremlin. The 
wording and structure of the Act's intervention references in-
dicate that they are directed more at military, rather than hu-
manitarian intervention. First of all, the Western interpreta-
tion is served by Section l(b)(l) which declares that the Guid-
ing Principles (which include Principles VI and VII) offers 
protection "in particular from invasion or attack on its terri-
tory. Participating states are: 
- To refrain from any manifestation of force for the pur-
pose of inducing another participating State to renounce 
the full exercise of its sovereign rights. 
- To refrain from any act of economic coercion deSigned to 
subordinate to their own interest the exercise by another par-
ticipating State of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and 
thus to secure advantages of any kind. 
Also, the only examples of forbidden intervention cited are of 
an inherently violent nature. Such coercion is unlikely to be 
used by the West in its support of the promotion of freedom of 
emigration in the Soviet Union.1OO Except for possible indirect 
propaganda benefits, Western pressures in support of freer 
88 Russel, .pra note 15. 
100 However enforcement of the economic coercion clause might be interpreted as 
militating against attempts such as the Jackson-Vanik amendment to directly tie 
trade benefits for the USSR to an easing of its emigration restrictions. The history 
of that amendment demonstrates that such direct economic attempts to effect in-
ternal change in the USSR are likely to be counter-productive and diplomatically 
embarrassing to the United States. See HUMAN RIGHTS (Samizdat), No. 1-6 
(1975); B. EISSENSTAT, THE SOVIET UNION, THE SEVENTIES AND BEYOND 105 
(1975). 
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movement for Soviet Jews simply cannot be deemed a subor-
dination of Soviet sovereignty to its own interests. 
Secondly, the non-intervention principle was not included in 
Basket III which deals most directly with human rights, par-
ticularly emigration. Soviet demands that modifying "laws, 
regulations, and customs" language be inserted in Basket III 
were rejected by the CSCE.tol A compromise provided that the 
preamble of Basket III would indicate "respect for the Princi-
ples Guiding Relations between Participating States.10J This 
seemingly indicates that the CSCE did not consider the Basket 
III provisions to be internal affairs whieh were beyond the scope 
of international influence. 
Having thus recognized the role of human rights in inter-
national relations, participated in extensive discussion over So-
viet policies and procedures during the CSCE, and included 
Basket Ill's lengthy and relatively specific provisions on this 
matter, it is inconsistent for Moscow to assert that the non-inter-
vention principle quarantines its human rights policies from 
outside analysis. It is doubtful if either the USSR or the United 
States i,s going to let inconsistency resulting from a still non-
binding' agreement stand in the way of their policy objectives. 
The Kremlin is less concerned with the legal construction of 
. Principle VI than it is with the balancing of the advantages of 
detente with the perpetuation of its control, both internally and 
throughout Eastern Europe. President Ford and Secretary of 
State Kissinger recognized the potential double interpretation 
of the non-intervention clause. However both refused to accept 
its application to Basket III. lOB Washington might be more in-
clined to alter this stance if it appears that other goals, such 
as the SALT negotiations, are fatally threatened by its promo-
tion of human rights in the East. Since both East and West are 
unlikely to recognize a Breshnev Doctrine/human rights inter-
101 REPoRT o. To S'l'UDY J.t:ISSION, npt'IJ note 9, at 29. 
102 Russel, npt'IJ note 15, at 267-68. 
108 Ford, 73 DBP'l'_ STATE BULL. 311 (1975); Kiasinrer, 73 DBP'l'. STAn BULL. 
320. (1975). 
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vention quid pro quo, they shall probably continue to invoke 
the non-intervention doctrine to suit their own needs. 1M 
IV. THE RELATION OF THE FINAL ACT To SOVIET EMIGRATION 
STANDARDS 
A. Relation to Oommunist Inter·national Legal Theory 
The Soviet position upon the implementation of the emigra-
tion related provisions of Basket III must be understood within 
the context of the communist theory of human rights. While the 
theory recognizes that international legal norms can provide an 
auxiliary vehicle for securing human rights, this recognition 
is qualified by the affirmation that these rights remain the do-
mestic affairs of the state. Although multinational agreements 
can obligate states to grant such rights to their citizens, they 
cannot grant them directly to individuals. Communist ideology 
asserts that human rights do not exist outside of the state.lOIi 
They are seen as strictly a social and class concept, having no 
independent, individual existence.loo Yet this theory was con-
tradicted in Guiding Principle VII which asserted that all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms "derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person." This assertion emphasized the 
Western belief that these rights are not merely privileges which 
governments have the option of extending to their citizens. lOT 
This theoretical disagreement between the East and West is 
further reflected in the emphasis which the Soviets put upon 
the Helsinki agreement's call for the freer movement of peo-
ple. They stress the promotion of tourism and official exchanges 
of representatives of various professional, cultural, and educa-
tional groups. This is in keeping with their emphasis upon the 
collective nature of human rights. It also suggests that the So-
viets are not prepared to see the freer movement provisions 
utilized to encourage emigration. The West recognizes the value 
104 Bee Browne, Breshflev to Vi8it Yugoslavia Today, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1976; 
REPORT OJ' THE STUDY MISSION, supra note 9, at 28-9. 
1011 TUNKIN, supra note 58, at 82-3. 
108 Bee Kudryavtsev, supra note 56, at 193-99. 
107 Bee Russel, supra note 15, at 269. 
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of such exchanges, but it places the freedom of movement sec-
tions into a broader humanitarian context which includes indi-
viduals. This context also stresses the right to permanently 
abandon one's country, as opposed to merely being allowed a 
temporary sojourn. 
B. Compatibility with Soviet Law 
This theoretical distinction need not be determinative, as the 
USSR claims that its laws do not conflict with the Final Act 
and the other international accords which deal with this point. 
Since under these accords the right to leave one's country is 
guaranteed, Jewish citizens should already possess this right, 
regardless of whether its origin is social or individual. Ac-
cordingly, the realization of Basket III goals need not be seen 
as an inherent threat to Soviet sovereignty or its legal system. 
Although the right to leave the USSR is not directly guaranteed 
in its laws, very few countries do accord such express legal rec-
ognition to the right.l08 There are, at least, no substantive laws 
restricting the right of Soviet citizens to emigrate. Thus, So-
viet law, is not intrinsically adverse to the concept of liberal emi-
gration. 
While a literal reading of the laws of the USSR constitutes 
an admirable creed of civil rights, Article 5 of the Fundamental 
Principles of Civil Legislation withdraws protection of these 
rights if they are "exercised in contradiction to the purpose 
of these rights in a socialist society during the period of the 
building of communism.lo9 Attempts to leave the USSR which 
108 Ingles, Il'Upra note 7, at 26, para. 69. 
109 CHALIDZE, Il'Upra note 79 at 46. A glaring example of how little is required for 
such a contradictory exercise is evidenced by the Soviet definition of treason. Treason 
includes any act which is: 
"to the detriment of state independence, the territorial inviolability, or 
military might of the USSR, . . . flight abroad or refusal to return abroad 
from the USSR. • • and rendering aid to a foreign state in carrying on 
hostile activity against the USSR," Article 64, Criminal Code of the 
R.S.F.S.R. 
No distinction is made between criminal and ideological offenses, Art. 70 of the 
Criminal Code calls for the deprivation of freedom for a term of six months to 
seven years to anyone attempting to "subvert or weaken the Soviet relime" 
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are not in accordance with government regulations constitute 
such a contradictory exercise. Violators are subject to criminal 
prosecution and three years of imprisonment.110 Such rigidity 
with respect to the enforcement of emigration restrictions is 
not simply a recent phenomena on the USSR. Throughout Rus-
sia's xenophobic history, the expression of a desire to leave the 
motherland has traditionally placed the potential emigre into a 
highly suspicious category. The toll of the perpetuation of this 
attitude can be one's job, education, and parental rights.111 As 
Marxism recognizes human rights as originating only in a so-
cial context, with the individual being assimilated into the 
political power, the person who is no longer a part of the col-
lective entity is in a frightening situation.112 The requirement 
that a petitioner first permanently renounce his Soviet citizen-
ship thus places him into just such a purgatory.u8 
In keeping with this denigration of an individual legal per-
sonality, Soviet authorities justify emigration restrictions on 
the grounds that they protect the "general welfare" and "eco-
nomic and social well being" of the remainder of the citizenry.ll. 
The right to emigrate is seen as a privilege which should only 
be granted if the rights of others would not be negatively af-
fected. ll11 Since the applicants have received benefits from their 
families and the system as a whole, they should therefore not 
be allowed to renege . upon their reciprocal obligations. Since 
almost any action has some relation to the "general welfare 
through "slanderous falsifieations which defame the Boviet state and Bocial Bys-
tem, " J ewiah protests of Boviet emigration policies are considered to be such 
alanderoUB falsificationB. See Berman, The Bight of Oonvicteil Oitwef&8 to Emigrate: 
..4 Oomment on the Euay by V.N. OhaU/he, 8 HABv. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV_ Lm. L. REV. 18-
19 (1973). 
110 See R_B.F.B.R. 1970 Criminal Code, Art. 83, in H. BEBllAN, BOVIET CRIMINAL 
LAW AND PRoCEDURE (2nd ed. trans. H. Berman and J. Bpindler 1972) at 156. 
111 BCBBOETER, supra note 10, at 370·71; Chalidze, supra note 79, at 46. 
112 See RAMUNDO, supra note 55, at 85·6. 
118 FELDBRUGGE, TOQ;ation, Natural PerlOf&8, II ENCYCLOPEDIA 01' BOVIET LAw 
(app. ix) 741 (F. Feldbrugge ed. 1973). 
114 See Kniasbacher, supra note 70, at 104-05. 
1111 Kudryavtsev, aupra note 56, at 198. 
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and well being," this rationale can easily be invoked as a strait 
jacket for those who wish to emigrate. 
Substantive law generally becomes relevant to the aspiring 
emigrant only when he has already run afoul of the adminis-
trative regulations. Of the major criminal laws so invoked, 
their equitable enforcement would place few barriers in the path 
of those wishing to leave.ll8 Enforcement modifications and the 
application of the human rights contained in the Soviet consti-
tutions would be sufficient to bring the substantive law of the 
USSR into line with Basket m.m 
O. Incompatibility with Soviet Administrative Practice and 
Procedures 
The administrative regulations relating to emigration are not 
so easily reconciled to Basket III. Since Soviet authorities view 
emigration as essentially an administrative, rather than judicial 
matter, these regulations are especially significant,11s 
Emigration is under the supervision of the Ministry of In-
ternal Affairs. Applications are handled by the Ministry's visa 
and Foreign Registration Section (OVIR).U9 Because of the 
lengthy, intricate, and even chaotic nature of its administrative 
process, an exhaustive legal analysis would be well beyond the 
. scope of this study. An analysis of its practices and procedures 
is complicated by its policy lluctuations and tendency not to 
reveal the rationale behind them. Prior to the OSOE, the regu-
lations governing its criteria for approvals or denial were not 
even known. The external requirements which were published 
were often inconsistent.l20 Since the signing of the Final Act, 
118 See examples ftl.pTG, note 109. 
117 See Bulzberger, Where Do We Go Now!, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1911, at 15, 
col. 2. 
llS This practice is in keeping with the general tendency of soeialist legislation 
to give a great deal of autonomy to administrative agencies. Toman, The Bight 
to LeGve Gna to B.etum in EGdem Europe, 5 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUKAN BIGHTS 314 
(1975). 
118 CBALmZE, 8ttprG note 19, at 98·9. 
120 Knissbaeher. ftl.prG note 9, at 57. 
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OVIR has, for the first time, officially stated its emigration 
rules.121 
It is difficult to utilize the Final A.ct to promote such general 
policy improvements, as the Helsinki accord does not directly 
guarantee the right of emigration to all citizens. The USSR 
successfully resisted Western attempts to insert such direct lan-
guage into the Final Act. As a compromise the Human COIl-
tacts section of Basket III rather vaguely supports the general 
right by its call for the facilitation of: 
. . . freer movement and contacts, individually and collec-
tively, privately or officially among persons ... and to con-
tribute to the solution of the humanitarian problems that 
arise in that connexion. 
It also reaffirms previous accords embodying the right. Of more 
immediate value to Soviet Jewry is subdivision (b) on the reuni-
fication of families.122 To even be eligible to apply for an exit 
visa, the petitioner must produce an invitation from a close rela-
tive living in the country of destination. These provisions are 
thus directly applicable to the more than 130,000 eligible Soviet 
Jews who are still waiting for a determination on their exit appli-
cations, as well as to many of the "refusniks".128 The section 
does not place limits upon the degree of family relationship 
which is required. This factor is often used by OVIR to justify 
denials.124 Even an immediate family relationship is sometimes 
deemed insufficient if the applicant has not seen the relative for 
a long period of time.121i In light of the rigid exit procedures, 
which shall be subsequently developed, this often is not the 
fault of the petitioner. However, the frequency of family con-
tacts has been disregarded in the use of the actions of relatives 
as justifications for the rejection of exit applications.126 Hope-
fully, the realization of the Final Act's general mandate to deal 
121 REPORT OF THE STUDY MISSION, supra note 9, at 57. 
122 ld. at 55. 
123 CHALlDZE, supra note 79 at 99. 
124 ld., at 99-100. 
125 ld. 
1261d. 
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with emigration requests in a "positive and humanitarian 
spirit" could soften such rigidity. 
OVIR's minimal procedural requirements alone are suffi-
ciently time consuming to be deemed a contradiction of the 
Final Act's exhortation to deal with these applications as "ex-
peditiously as possible." After receipt of the initial invitation 
from a relative, OVIR swamps the applicant with a deluge of 
often trivial paperwork.127 Since the CSCE, some progress has 
been made in this area. An applicant no longer is required to 
obtain references from the director of his place of employment, 
the secretary of his trade union, and the local secretary of the 
Communist party.128 The latter had been required even if he 
was not a party member.129 However he must still present a 
medical certificate, verification of his place of employment, and 
affidavits evidencing the consent of his spouse and parents (re-
gardless of the applicant's age) to his emigration. ISO Because 
of the pervasive power of the Soviet state, all of the above par-
ties can easily be subjected to hostile pressures.l8l Further-
more, one must always deal with OVIR personally, as he can-
not act ,through the mail or by the representation of counsePS2 
This can require the applicant to take frequent leaves of ab-
sence from his job. Another improvement since the CSCE is 
, that OVIR now allows its local branches to handle initial appli-
cations, rather than requiring the petitioner to go to the central 
authorities. ISS 
The reunification of families subsection states that the sig-
natories "will lower when necessary the fees charged in con-
nection with these applications to ensure that they are at a 
moderate level." The inclusion of this provision clearly re-
flects one of the most frequent criticisms of the Soviet emigra-
tion process. The petitioner must first pay a 500 rouble fee 
127 ld. 
128 REPORT OF TUE STUDY MISSION, 8upra note 9, at 57. 
129 CHALIDZE, supra note 79, at 99. 
130 ld., at 100. 
181 Hearings on H. Res. 861, supra note, 2, at 96. 
132 CHALIDZE, supra note' 79, at 100. 
l3S REPORT OJ' THE STUDY MISSION, supra note 9, at 57. 
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for the renunciation of Soviet citizenship, in addition to gen-
eral exit and visa fees of 300 roubles. Prior to Helsinki, the 
latter fee was 400 roubles.18' In the past the applicant had also 
been subject to the controversial education tax which was to 
reimburse the state for the "free" education and training it 
has bestowed. Estimates of these mandatory reimbursements 
ranged from $5,000 to $37,400.1811 Because of the hostile West-
ern reaction to the imposition of the tax, the Soviet government 
has announced its discontinuation. However it was a most 
effective impediment, as up to 40% of those trying to leave the 
USSR have received higher educations.1B8 Furthermore, edu-
cational distinctions are made by the administrative favoritism 
shown to those who have studied in non-scientific or non-tech-
nical fields.18T 
The alleviation of these taxes has been somewhat negated by 
the imposition of higher taxation upon the use of foreign cur-
rencies. Since the signing of the Final Act, new regulations 
prohibit foreign monetary gifts to Soviet residents;l88 The 30% 
tax upon the transfer of any foreign currency already in the 
USSR has also been increased.18o These actions have a devas-
tating effect upon those who wish to emigrate. Outside funds 
are often essential to pay the exit fees. Since the mere emigra-
tion application often means the immediate loss of one's job, 
such assistance may be especially necessary. Western Jewry's 
efforts in this regard will thus be hampered. This inhibition is 
in contradiction to the stipulation in subsection (b) that: 
Until members of the same family are reunited, meetings 
and contacts between them may take place in accordance 
with the modalities for contacts on the basis of family ties. 
184 Pettiti, mprtl note 49. The current value of a rouble 11 .1.35. 400 roubles 
would represent an average of four months wages. CIULIDZB, IUpro note 79, at 
106. 
1811 N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1972, at 3. 
188 SCBBOETD, IU,Ttl note 10, at 355. 
18T Id., at 364-65. 
188 IIetlriflg8 on II. Be8. 864, IU,Ttl note 2, at 80. 
188 HUMAN RIGHTS (Samizdat), No_I-6 (1975), at 15. 
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These modalities provide for the facilitation of temporary and 
regular visits to relatives living in another country. It provides 
the same guidelines and protections that are found in the fol-
lowing subsection on the reunification of families. Jewish lead-
ers realize the improbability that the USSR would permit such 
temporary meetings outside its borders. Their immediate hope 
is that the Soviet authorities will cease their interception of 
non-physical communications between Soviet Jews and their 
Western counterparts. Aside from the new financial restric-
tions, reports of other forms of communication obstruction 
have been frequent. 
One of the most frequent grounds for rejection is that the 
applicant's detention is necessary on military or national secu-
rity grounds. In the absence of special permission, Soviet regu-
lations provide that one who has been privy to secret, classified 
materials may not leave the country for two to five years from 
the time of exposure. However, denials have still been issued 
after the expiration of this period.14o Since the Soviets are 
notoriously secretive about such matters, a large number of 
potenti&l emigres are affected. Utilization of security restric-
tions to impede emigration is facilitated by the standard re-
quirement that those working on classified projects sign a con-
ventional form stating that they are doing so. However one is 
not warned that signing this document could bar him from leav-
ing the country.1f1 Since he is likely to be fired or demoted for 
having applied to leave, this mandatory waiting period can be 
quite hazardous. He is unable to contest the security classifica-
tion, as no criteria are available to him for the evaluation of 
such a claim.142 If the applicant has not been privy to such in-
formation, the authorities have not hesitated to call up the pe-
titioner for military induction or retraining. This automatically 
exposes him to classified information. This pretext can be re-
peatedly invoked upon the petitioner in order to extend the 
waiting period. Western concern over such pressures led the 
140 Knissbaeher, 8'Upra note 70, at 104. 
1fl REPORT 0" THE STUDY MISSION, 8'Upra note 9, at 58. 
142 Knissbaeher, 8'Upra note 70. at 104. 
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OSOE to insert into Basket III the protection that "the presen-
tation of an application concerning family reunification will not 
modify the rights and obligations of the applicant or members 
of his family." 168 
The position of the rejected applicant is especialy precarious, 
despite the provisions of section 1 (b) of Basket III which pro-
vides that: 
Applications for the purpose of family reunification which 
are not granted may be renewed at the appropriate level and 
will be reconsidered at reasonably short intervals by the au-
thorities of the country of residence ... under such circum-
stances fees will be charged only when applications are 
granted. 
Because of the OVIR policy of issuing oral refusals which do 
not state the cause of the denial, the rejectee does not know if 
he is permanently or temporarily ineligible.1" In view of the 
difficulty of ascertaining the grounds for the denial and the even 
greater hardship and uncertainty involved in repeating the en-
tire process, the petitioner may well hesitate to renew his ap-
plication. On the other hand, his position may have already 
deteriorated to the desperate point where he has . little left to 
lose. There has been some improvement in OVIR's reapplica-
tion policies. Applications rejected since Helsinki are now eli-
gible for reconsideration every six months, rather than an-
nually.l'lI Also, the passport fee is not levied on reapplications. 
However very few reconsidered applications have been ap-
proved.u8 
Soviet Jews who find their right to leave the country ob-
structed by the government are thus faced with a dilemma. So 
far, appeals to the West have proven to be the only effective 
means of budging the authorities. Yet, such appeals can make 
the protesters vulnerable to criminal prosecution under a loose 
148 73 DEPT. STATE BULL. 340 (1975). 
1" CHALIDZE, 8upra note 79, at 103. 
145 REPORT OF THE STUDY MISSION, 8'Upra note 9, at 58; See SCHROETER, ThB 
Jewi8h Freedom Movement in the Soviet Union: Confrontation Tactics in a Totali-
tarian Society, 1 CIVIL LIBERTIES REVIEW 100 (1974). 
146 Td. 
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reading of the Criminal Code.147 It is submitted that conviction 
would certainly constitute a modification of the "rights and 
obligations of the applicant and of members of his family." 148 
While the protest tactics have occasionally succeeded, at-
tempts to challenge administrative rulings in the Soviet courts 
on the grounds of international law have generally failed. One 
example is the K olyaditskaya case, in which a Soviet lawyer 
attempted to invoke the Convention on the Nationality of Mar-
ried Women in order to join her husband in Israel. The provi-
sions of this accord include those later embodied in section 1 (c) 
of Basket III, concerning marriage between citizens of different 
states. The Convention was legally binding and allowed an in-
dividual recourse to the International Court of Justice. The 
Soviet court ruled against Mrs. Kolyaditskaya's petition. How-
ever the publicity surrounding the case prompted the authori-
ties to grant permission to emigrate before her case could be 
brought to the International Court.l" 
Despite the post-Helsinki clarification and modification of 
the regulations, OVIR's administrative procedures and prac-
tices still do little to facilitate "freer movement" and solve the 
"related humanitarian problems." These reforms have had lit-
tle measurable effect due to the perpetuation of the Kremlin's 
. underlying hostility to Jewish emigration. More than cosmetic 
alterations of the regulations will be needed to alleviate the 
hardship they impose upon the applicants. Far narrower inter-
pretations of what constitutes such terms as "national security" 
and "general welfare" are called for. 
v. FRoM HELSINKI To BELGRADE: POST CSCE DEVELOPMENTS 
Since the signing of the Final Act, the Soviet government 
has tightened internal controls to insulate the Russian people 
147 See note 109 B1Ip1'G. 
148 Aside from having their emigration requests denied on aeeount of the aetions 
of other family members, relatives ean also easily be eonvieted as aeeompliees. See 
Art. 88·1, Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R. 
148 CHALIDZE, B1Ip1'G note 79, at 47·48. 
lGO See Shulman, B1Ip1'G note 8, at 332·34. 
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from increased Western contacts.lllO The resulting repression 
is demonstrated by the drop in Jewish emigration since the 
OSOE. While an average of 13,000 Jews left the USSR monthly 
in 1975, only 1,000 per month did so in 1976.1111 Unfortunately, 
the non-binding Final Act does not provide for sanctions or 
judicial recourse as a response to such actions. It simply calls 
for future evaluative meetings. The first of these meetings is 
to take place in Belgrade in June, 1977. As could be expected, 
the Soviets wish to have Basket I and II issues dominate this 
session, while the West wishes to stress the implementation of 
Basket III.11l2 
In order to bolster the legal force of the Act, it has been 
proposed that the Helsinki accord be ratified and declared bind-
ing at Belgrade. Even if this were to be done, enforcement 
would still be difficult to achieve. The Berlin Oonference of the 
Warsaw Pact recently proposed that all U.N. drafted human 
rights pacts be ratified and strictly observed. However their 
motivation was to aid "the struggle of the capitalist countries' 
working people for real social and political rights." 1118 
Of greater long run significance is the effect which the Final 
Act has had upon the Russian people. It has sparked an upsurge 
in emigration applications throughout the USSR and Eastern 
Europe. The petitioners are supporting their requests with di-
rect references to the pledges of the Final Act.lM Kremlin com-
pliance with its provisions is being directly monitored to the 
West by a group of Russian dissidents.lllll These developments 
1111 Soviet authorities attribute the drop to a decrease in the number of applica-
tions submitted_ This explanation is contested by other sources, who claim that 
there has been a marked increase in the number of applications filed by both Jews 
and Gentiles_ Certain non-Jewish nationalities have received an increased number of 
visas. See SPECIAL REPORT OJ' THE STUDY MISSION, BUpra note 9, at 2-3, 6, 56-7. 
1112 Id., at 7_ 
1118 Zagladin, Europe: Route of Peace and Social Progress, Pravda, July 28, 
1976, at 4-5; reprinted in XXVIII THE CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS 
30 (Aug. 25, 1976) at 11-12. 
1114 SPECIAL REPORT OJ' THE STUDY MISSION, supra note 9, at 2-3. 
11111 Despite the arrest of many of its members, the. committee is still functioning 
and encouraging the West to pressure Soviet authorities into compliance. See Wren, 
Soviet Dissenters Vow to Fight On, N.Y. Timee, Mar. 2,1977, at 6 .. 
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may bring about some liberalization of Kremlin emigration 
policies, as the USSR is cognizant of the effect which such ac-
tions may have upon world public opinion. 
In seeking to promote a positive image, the USSR is still 
unlikely to capitUlate to what it considers economic blackmail,1" 
In view of its economic self sufficiency, it is highly improbable 
that it would feel compelled to reverse itself and suddenly allow 
unlimited emigration to her Jews. Such a humiliating action 
could be interpreted as recognition of the failure of her nation-
ality policy. Secondly it would set a precedent which might en-
courage other nationalities in the USSR to demand a similar 
right to leave "en masse". Thirdly, Israel would be unable to 
immediately absorb the gigantic influx which would suddenly 
arrive. Finally, the USSR is unlikely to risk the alienation of 
the Arab nations by such an infusion of Zionist recruits. 
Since completely free emigration from the USSR is an un-
realistic goal, the West should strive for the more readily ob-
tainable goals of implementing the more limited and precise 
provisions of Basket III. This would require changes in OVIR's 
administrative policies. However, a less repressive interpreta-
tion of existing Soviet law would generally be acceptable. 
While world opinion should continue to press for immediate 
. emigration in extreme hardship cases, a reasonably small, but 
steady, flow of emigres might be satisfactory. The Cuban air-
lift to the United States, despite its deficiencies, might provide 
a model for such a program. However, acceptance by the West 
and Soviet Jewry would be contingent upon an end to the dis-
crimination shown to the remaining applicants. It would also 
be understood that they would not have to wait indefinitely. 
Until some sort of machinery is formed to implement Basket 
TIl, the West should continue to use alternative channels, such 
as the United Nations. The modest efforts of the Secretary 
General of the U.N. have already proven to be quite successful 
in this regard.1Ii7 
1118 See Trudeau, Doone/iburg, The Boston Globe, Mar. 3,1977, at 21, coL 2. 
1117 65 DEPT. STATE BULL. 663·64 (1971). 
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Under the Carter administration, the United States has be-
come increasingly insistent that the USSR honor its human 
rights commitments.158 The President has based this stance 
squarely upon the Helsinki accords, rather than the previous 
human rights accordsym The administration has also moved to 
correct our own violations of the Final Act, particularly through 
the modification of immigration laws.16o These moves should 
serve to improve the United States position at Belgrade. The 
Kremlin should be made to understand that the American pub-
lic will have less faith in further bilateral agreements if it 
appears that the USSR has already disregarded the Final Act. 
However, Western human rights pressures could also force 
Breshnev into such a defensive position that he will be par-
ticularly obstinate to avoid any appearance of capitUlation. This 
situation requires that Western policy makers strike a balance 
between the utilization of opportunities to promote the emigra-
tion of Soviet Jews and the exercise of restraint by not pur-
suing unrealistic goals which could permanently jeopardize cru-
cial areas of East-West relations. Hopefully, the realization 
of the security which the USSR sought in the CSCE will make 
the Soviets more receptive to the promotion of humanitarian, 
as well as economic and military cooperation. 
STEPHEN H. MEETER 
158 Sulzberger, 8upra note 92. 
159 N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1977, at 13, col. 6. 
160 TIME, Mar. 7, 1977, at 11, col. 2; The Boston Globe, Mar. 10, 1977, at 30, 
col. 2. 
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